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The promoters . . . had their reasons for celebration. . . .
[T]hey had set up the Crédit Mobilier, into whose chest the
gains from contracts for the whole Union Pacific building had
flowed. . . . The proceeds from government bonds, security
sales, and sales of lands and town sites had all been swallowed
up in the mounting costs of building or in other ways. For this
work the directors of the Union Pacific had ingeniously con-
tracted with themselves at prices which rose from $80,000 to
$90,000 and $96,000 a mile, twice the maximum estimates of
engineers. . . . Hence the jubilation of the Union Pacific ring.
For what profits could they have awaited, if they had confined
themselves purely to traﬃcking in freight or passengers
through the empty prairies?
—Matthew Josephson (1934, p. 92)
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4.1 Introduction
The Crédit Mobilier manipulation was a spectacular scandal. Directors
of the Union Pacific Railroad had organized their own construction com-
pany and had awarded themselves contracts to build the transcontinental
line. Although historians have long debated whether this arrangement
yielded participants an exorbitant rate of return,1 there is no doubt con-
temporaries thought it did. Even so, what made headlines was less this
siphoning oﬀ of profits than the involvement of the federal government,
which had granted the Union Pacific extensive tracts of public lands and
also loans to finance construction. According to charges in the news-
papers, the “railroad ring” had handed out shares in Crédit Mobilier to
influential congressmen, buying political influence in order to forestall
inconvenient scrutiny as well as to secure additional federal largesse
(Josephson 1934; Bain 1999).2
The hoopla that surrounded these revelations of bribery has obscured
for modern observers the extent to which conflicts of interest, like those at
the heart of the Crédit Mobilier scandal, were endemic to corporations at
the time. Although cases rarely made headlines unless they involved com-
panies, such as major railroad or telegraph lines, that were important to the
public welfare,3 the legal record from the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries suggests that directors of corporations large and small fre-
quently negotiated contracts with other companies in which they had a
financial interest,4 elected themselves to corporate oﬃces at lucrative
salaries that they themselves set,5 arranged mergers that earned themselves
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1. Compare, for example, the accounts in Josephson (1934) and Bain (1999) with those of
Kirkland (1961) and Summers (1993).
2. Intriguingly, details of the Crédit Mobilier manipulation had been reported in the press
since at least 1869, but attracted little attention until the New York Sun, which opposed the
reelection of President Ulysses S. Grant, broke the bribery story in September, 1872 (Bain
1999, pp. 599–600, 602, 627–28, 676).
3. Examples include “The Telegraph Combination,” New York Times, August 22, 1877,
p. 8; “More Trouble for Gould: Metropolitan Stockholders to Have an Inning,” New York
Times, November 5, 1882, p. 7; “He Shot Me Like a Dog,” New York Times, December 29,
1883, p. 4; “Accused of Conspiracy: A Blow at Jay Gould and his Friends,” New York Times,
March 3, 1885, p. 2; “The Pennsylvania Interested: The Fight for the Cincinnati, Hamilton
and Dayton,” New York Times, May 3, 1885, p. 2.
4. For examples of cases involving such contracts, see Smith v. Poor, 40 Me. 415 (1855);
March v. Eastern Railroad, 40 N.H. 548 (1860); Flint and Pere Marquette Railway v. Dewey, 14
Mich. 477 (1866); Ashhurst’s Appeal, 60 Pa. 290 (1869); Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass.
378 (1870); Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870); European and North American Railway Co. v.
Poor, 59 Me. 277 (1871); Kelly v. Newburyport and Amesbury Horse Railroad, 141 Mass. 496
(1886); Warren v. Para Rubber Shoe Co., 166 Mass. 97 (1896); and Burden v. Burden, 159 N.Y.
287 (1899). See also the much more extensive list of cases in Marsh (1966) and Mark (2003).
5. For examples of cases involving charges of excessive compensation, see Dunphy v. Trav-
eller Newspaper Association, 146 Mass. 495 (1888); Brown v. De Young, 167 Ill. 549 (1897); Von
Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass. 515 (1905); Abbott v. Harbeson Textile Co., 147
N.Y.S. 1031 (1914); Cole v. Wells, 224 Mass. 504 (1916); Almy v. Almy, Bigelow & Washburn,
235 Mass. 227 (1920).
impressive capital gains while leaving other shareholders in the lurch,6 and
engaged in a wide variety of other actions from which they benefited at the
expense of their associates. Examples included lending themselves corpo-
rate funds, issuing themselves additional shares of stock, and settling law-
suits against their companies that they had helped to bring in the first
place.7
Following the conventions of this volume, we label this behavior fraud
rather than corruption because it did not involve the use of government re-
sources for private gain. Nonetheless, we would like to emphasize that, in
the case of corporations, such a distinction would not have made much
sense prior to the 1850s. Indeed, at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
corporations were still regarded as quasi-governmental institutions. Busi-
nesspeople who wanted to form them had to seek special permission from
the state, which tended only to be granted for projects deemed to be in the
public interest, and many corporations obtained part of their capital stock
from state treasuries. As the utility of the corporate form for ordinary busi-
ness purposes became increasingly apparent, however, pressure mounted
on legislatures to make the form more widely available—to prevent a fa-
vored few from engrossing its benefits. State governments responded to
these political pressures first by making it easier to secure a special charter,
and then (around the middle of the nineteenth century) by passing general
incorporation laws that routinized the whole process, enabling anyone who
so desired to form a corporation by fulfilling some standard requirements,
filing a form, and paying a fee. In the process, the corporation lost its public
character and came to be thought of as a wholly private institution (Hurst
1970; Maier 1993; Bloch and Lamoreaux 2004; Wallis 2005).
Despite this privatization, fraudulent extractive behavior by control-
ling shareholders in corporations potentially undermined the security of
investors’ property rights in much the same way as did corrupt extractive
behavior by government oﬃcials. Like citizens, moreover, minority share-
holders had only limited ability to protect themselves against abuse. Stan-
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6. For examples of cases involving such charges, see Peabody v. Flint, 88 Mass. 52 (1863);
Converse v. United Shoe Machinery, 185 Mass. 422 (1914); and Bonner v. Chapin National
Bank, 251 Mass. 401 (1925). For a more extensive list of cases, see Carney (1980). These kinds
of manipulations were more likely to make the newspapers, as, for example, when the direc-
tors and controlling shareholders of the Brush Electric Company of Cleveland, Ohio,
arranged to sell their stockholdings to businessmen who controlled the Thomson-Houston
Electric Company for $75 a share. The par value of the stock was $50, and its market price
was estimated at that time to be $35. Minority shareholders were outraged that they were not
included in the deal. New York Times, January 21, 1890, p. 1.
7. For examples of cases involving such charges, see Hersey v. Veazie, 24 Me. 9 (1844);
Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. 371 (1847); Abbott v. Merriam, 62 Mass. 588 (1851); Leslie v. Loril-
lard, 110 N.Y. 519 (1888); Continental Securities v. Belmont, 133 N.Y.S. 560 (1912); Dunlay v.
Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274 (1930). A less venal example involved Col. El-
liott F. Shepard, who bought control of the Fifth-Avenue Transportation Company for reli-
gious reasons in order to stop the running of stages on Sundays, evoking protests from mi-
nority shareholders who objected to the loss of revenues. New York Times, May 10, 1888, p. 5.
dard corporate governance rules based on the principle of one vote per
share meant that shareholders who possessed enough stock to decide elec-
tions were eﬀectively dictators.8 If the majority pursued policies that mem-
bers of the minority thought were wrongheaded or detrimental to their
interests, there was little that the latter could do. Minority shareholders
could not make the majority change their policies. Nor could they force a
dissolution of the enterprise. Nor could they easily exit by selling their eq-
uity. In the case of publicly traded firms, they would only be able to sell oﬀ
their holdings at a price discounted to reflect the majority’s behavior; in the
case of closely held corporations, often the only buyers for their shares
were the same majority shareholders with whom they were in conflict.9
The intriguing puzzle is that, despite these problems, businesspeople
kept forming corporations and minority shareholders kept investing in
them. George Heberton Evans, Jr., has counted the number of corporate
charters granted in a sample of key states and found a steady rise between
the Civil War and the Great Depression. Indeed, the increase was so steep
that Evans’s index of incorporations (1925  100) had a value of only
about 5 in 1870. In Ohio, for example, the number of charters increased
from an average of 305 per year during the 1870s to 1,166 per year from
1895 to 1904, to 4,047 per year during the 1920s.10 Although the growth
was most rapid in the smallest size categories of firms, investors were in-
creasingly willing to risk their savings in large corporations as well. As
early as the 1870s, the authorized capital of new Ohio corporations valued
at over $1 million averaged $37.6 million per year. The Ohio figures for
later decades are not as informative because large corporations were in-
creasingly choosing to organize first in New Jersey and then in Delaware.
In New Jersey, the authorized capital of firms valued at over $1 million av-
eraged $928.4 million per year from 1895 to 1904, and in Delaware, the
comparable annual average was $18,814.2 million by the 1920s (Evans
1948, appendix 3). Moreover, as Mary O’Sullivan has shown, relative to
gross domestic product (GDP) the value of new corporate equity issues on
the New York Stock Exchange rose between the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to levels that, even without the boom years of the late
1920s, were higher than those in the second half of the twentieth century,
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8. For a more extensive discussion of the importance of these rules, see Lamoreaux and
Rosenthal (2005) and Lamoreaux (2004), which show that the courts made it diﬃcult for firms
in the United States to adopt nonstandard governance rules. For a comparison of voting rules
in U.S. corporations with those in corporations in other countries, see Dunlavy (2004).
9. By the mid-twentieth century, it was becoming increasingly common for shareholders
to protect themselves with buyout agreements. Even this remedy could be ineﬀective, how-
ever, if the majority prevented the corporation from accumulating the necessary surplus or
manipulated the book value of the enterprise. It could also impose a costly burden on the firm
(Hornstein 1950; Hillman 1982).
10. The trend seems to have been unaﬀected by the imposition of the income tax in 1916,
which subjected investors in corporations to double taxation.
when the Securities and Exchange Commission protected investors in pub-
licly traded corporations (O’Sullivan 2004).
The sheer magnitude of these numbers would seem to indicate that fear
of expropriation did not significantly deter investment in corporations dur-
ing this period. These numbers are not the whole story, however, for large
numbers of partnerships were also formed during these years. Reliable data
are not available until 1900, when the Census of Manufacturers reported
information on organizational form, but at that time, 67 percent of all U.S.
manufacturing establishments owned by more than one person were or-
ganized as partnerships and only 29 percent as corporations, with the re-
maining 4 percent consisting mainly of cooperatives (U.S. Census Oﬃce
1902, p. 503).11 Although partnerships on average were significantly
smaller than corporations (the census valued the total product of partner-
ships at $2.57 billion, as opposed to $7.73 billion for corporations), their
numerical dominance is highly suggestive. The literature has generally
treated partnerships as an inferior organizational form, one that mainly
had utility for law firms and other similar businesses that depended on spe-
cialized human capital for their success (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Gil-
son and Mnookin 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995; Cai 2003;
Blair 2003; Rebitzer and Taylor 2004).12 The high proportion of partner-
ships in the manufacturing sector raises the question of whether business-
people were deliberately choosing a suboptimal form in order to avoid the
governance problems associated with corporations.
We address this question by exploring the decision to organize a new
firm as a corporation or a partnership. In sections 4.2 and 4.3, we show that
the legal rules governing these two forms meant that each alternative was
subject to a diﬀerent organizational problem. In the case of partnerships,
the ability of any member of the firm to force a dissolution meant that part-
ners were potentially subject to disruption. In the case of corporations, the
power that controlling shareholders possessed to make decisions unilater-
ally meant that they could capture more than their fair share of the enter-
prise’s returns. We develop a simple model of these alternative problems
and show that the willingness of investors to participate in corporations, as
opposed to partnerships, was aﬀected by the extent to which their returns
could be expropriated by controlling shareholders. We also show that in-
vestors’ willingness to join a partnership, rather than not participating in
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11. Economy-wide counts are not available until after 1916, when the Internal Revenue
Service began to collect the income tax. In 1920, there were approximately 314,000 corpora-
tions in the United States, compared to about 241,000 partnerships, but it is likely that these
figures greatly understate the total number of partnerships because all corporations, however
small or unprofitable, were required to file tax returns, whereas partnerships only had to file
if their income exceeded the threshold for the tax (U.S. Internal Revenue Service 1922, pp.
8–10).
12. For a rare contrary example of an article arguing for the superiority of partnerships
over corporations, see Ribstein (2005).
the enterprise at all, was a function of the probability that a dispute among
the partners would lead to a premature dissolution of the firm.
In section 4.4 we explore the limits that the legal system placed on the
share of profits that controlling shareholders could engross. We find that,
if anything, these restraints became laxer over the course of our period.
Nonetheless, we argue, this change probably had little adverse eﬀect on the
pace of economic growth. The implication of our model is that organiza-
tional problems would only dissuade investors from putting their funds in
firms whose expected returns were low. Because there was an abundance of
good, highly profitable projects in the United States during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, investors willingly participated in the
formation of large numbers of new enterprises, including an increasing
number of corporations.
4.2 Partnerships and the Problem of Untimely Dissolution
Under Anglo-American common law, partnerships were not legal per-
sons and thus had no existence or identity that was independent of the
specific individuals who formed them. Each partner possessed full own-
ership rights and, without consulting the other partners, could enter into
contracts that were binding on the firm so long as those contracts were
within the scope of the firm’s normal business activities. Not only was this
right to act unilaterally in and of itself a potential source of conflict within
the firm, but it also meant that partners (all of whom were unlimitedly li-
able for the firm’s debts) faced obligations that were beyond their control
or perhaps even beyond their knowledge. Because businesspeople hesi-
tated to enter into such relationships unless they could extricate them-
selves when their partners proved untrustworthy, partnerships typically
existed “at will.” That is, any member of the firm could force a dissolution
simply by deciding that he or she no longer wanted to be part of the en-
terprise.13
As a result, partnerships potentially suﬀered from what we call the prob-
lem of untimely dissolution. Because each partner had full ownership
rights and could act without consulting the others, there was a high prob-
ability that disagreements would arise that might induce one member of
the firm to dissolve the enterprise. Such disagreements were potentially
costly. At the very least, they might disrupt the functioning of what other-
wise had been a profitable enterprise. More ominously, they might require
the liquidation of firm-specific assets at prices below their value had the
enterprise been able to continue. Because dissolution was so potentially
costly, the at-will character of partnerships also created opportunities for
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13. There are a number of treatises detailing the law of partnership during this period, but
see especially Story (1859) and Gillmore (1911). 
holdup. That is, a partner could attempt to extract a greater share of the
firm’s revenue just by threatening dissolution.14
Although partners could in theory contract around this problem by stip-
ulating that the firm continue for a fixed period time, there was consider-
able uncertainty in the late nineteenth century about whether the courts
would enforce such agreements (Gilmore 1911, pp. 571–73). For example,
some courts refused to allow dissolution if the complaining party was the
source of the dissension. In the words of an Illinois justice, “it would be in-
equitable to allow [such a person] advantage from his own wrongful acts,”
especially because “the results flowing from the premature dissolution of
a partnership might be most disastrous to a partner who had embarked
his capital in the enterprise” and who had been innocent of any “wrongful
act or omission of duty” (Gerard v. Gateau, 84 Ill. 121 [1876]). Similarly, in
Hannaman v. Karrick, a Utah justice insisted that a partner should not be
“allowed to ruin the business of the firm from mere caprice, or of his own
volition, without cause, and in violation of his agreement, and sacrifice the
entire object of the partnership” (9 Utah 236 [1893]).
Other courts, however, refused to enforce the continuation of a partner-
ship on the grounds that “it is a rule in equity that the court will not decree
a specific performance where it has no power to enforce the decree”
(Mechem 1920, pp. 196–98). As the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
declared in Morris v. Peckham (51 Conn. 128 at 133 [1883]), “partnership
articles will not be enforced . . . even where a time is fixed” because it was
beyond the bench’s power to ensure that all members of a firm performed
their duties on an ongoing basis.15 Moreover, many judges thought that it
made little sense to force a partner to continue the association against his
or her will because “no partnership can eﬃciently or beneficially carry on
its business without the mutual confidence and co-operation of all the
partners” (Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328 at 336 [1897]). Indeed, some
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14. To give an early example, E. I. Dupont’s partner, Peter Bauduy, attempted to boost his
share of the firm’s income by demanding to count as part of his contribution to capital a note
he had endorsed for the benefit of the enterprise. Bauduy threatened dissolution and “could
not be pacified” except by a new contract in which he “exacted from the concern some extra
compensation and advantages.” See “Answer of Eleuthere Irénée Dupont made in his own
name as well as in behalf of Mess. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. to the bill filed in chancery
by Peter Bauduy against him and the said concern,” 1817, Special Papers, Bauduy Lawsuit
(Part I) (1805–1828), Longwood Mss., Box 45, Accession Group 5, E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., Series C, Hagley Library Manuscript Collections, Wilmington, Del.
For a more general discussion of holdup in partnerships, see Bodenhorn (2002). Boden-
horn argues that individuals mitigated this problem by selecting as partners individuals of
similar age, productivity, and capital. We do not deny that businesspeople adopted a variety
of strategies to reduce the likelihood of holdup, but the large number of dissolution suits in
the legal record and the short life span of most partnerships suggests that the problem of un-
timely dissolution was very real.
15. In this particular case the duration of the contract at stake was not clear, but the judge
declared the principle in the broadest possible terms. See also Buck v. Smith, 29 Mich. 166
(1874).
courts worried that restrictions on dissolution might themselves be perni-
cious and went so far as to declare that the right to dissolve a partnership
at will could not be contracted away. Quoting an early New York decision,
for example, the Michigan Supreme Court asserted that “there can be no
such thing as an indissoluble partnership.” To rule otherwise would be to
expose a member of the firm to the opportunism of his or her associates.
“The power given by one partner to another to make joint contracts for
them both is not only a revocable power, but a man can do no act to divest
himself of the capacity to revoke it” (Solomon v. Kirkwood, 55 Mich. 256
[1884], citing Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 513 [N.Y. 1822]).
The remedy that courts promoting this view oﬀered to partners who had
been victimized by threats of untimely dissolution was to sue for breach of
contract rather than force a continuation of the firm. A partnership agree-
ment was thus to be treated like any other contract: it could “be broken at
pleasure, subject however to responsibility in damages” (Solomon v. Kirk-
wood, 55 Mich. 256 at 260 [1884]). Objecting to this position, the Utah
court complained that such a remedy could never provide “complete jus-
tice” to the aggrieved party, for not only was “this mode of redress . . . usu-
ally slow and unsatisfactory,” but the resulting “damages, in many cases,
must necessarily prove to be utterly inadequate to compensate for the de-
struction of a profitable and growing business” (Hannaman v. Karrick, 9
Utah 236 at 241–42 [1893]).16 Although this criticism had considerable
merit, it did not carry the day. Indeed, it was the contrary view—that the
only diﬀerence “so far as concerns the right of dissolution by one partner”
between partnerships at will and those for specified terms was that “in the
former case, the dissolution is no breach of the partnership agreement, and
aﬀords the other partner no ground of complaint,” whereas in the latter
“such a dissolution before the expiration of the time stipulated is a breach
of the agreement, and as such to be compensated in damages” (Karrick v.
Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328 [1897])17—that came to dominate and was en-
shrined in the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) in the second decade of the
twentieth century (Richards 1921).
The net eﬀect of the enactment of UPA was to establish with greater cer-
tainty the principle that all partnerships, even those established for a fixed
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16. Although in principle the injured party would be compensated forgone profits (see
cases ranging from Bagley v. Smith, 10 N.Y. 489 [1853], to Zimmerman v. Harding, 227 U.S.
489 [1913]), the courts were necessarily conservative in estimating uncertain future profits
(Ramsay v. Meade, 37 Colo. 465 [1906]).
17. Although partnerships were normally matters of state rather than federal law, this case
had been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court when Utah was still a territory under federal
authority. In such matters, unlike constitutional issues, the Supreme Court did not make law
for the nation, but the decision of such a prestigious court carried enormous weight. Justice
Horace Gray’s opinion in the case is particularly interesting because he went out of his way
to criticize the Utah judge’s view of partnerships, even though he admitted that it was not nec-
essary for the adjudication of the appeal for him “to express an opinion upon this point.”
term, were dissolvable at will. By defining some attempts to end partner-
ships prematurely as illegitimate breaches of contract punishable by an
award of damages, the new legal rules did put limits on partners’ ability to
increase their wealth by holding each other up. Short of a systematic study
of damage awards at the lower-court level, there is no way of knowing ex-
actly what these limits were in actual practice or whether they had a signif-
icant eﬀect on partners’ behavior. We do know, however, that to the extent
that a partner was able to make the case that another member of the firm
was at fault or that general dissension among the partners made continued
operation impossible, she or he would be able to escape damages entirely.
Even courts that had been reluctant to dissolve partnerships before the ex-
piration of their terms consistently asserted this rule. Hence the Utah judge
in Hannaman v. Karrick admitted that “where there is such a breach be-
tween the partners as to render continuance impossible, or when dissen-
sion has dispelled the hopes, prospects, and advantages which induced its
formation, or if for any just cause the partnership ought to be dissolved be-
fore the expiration of the term, then a court of equity is competent to grant
relief” (9 Utah 236 [1893]). Similarly, the Illinois judge acknowledged in
Gerard v. Gateau “that such embittered relations may exist as would render
it impracticable to conduct the business, and justify a decree dissolving the
partnership, admits of no discussion, on principle as well as upon author-
ity” (84 Ill. 121 [1876]). Serious dissension among partners was, and always
had been, grounds for dissolving a firm.
4.2.1 A Simple Model of Partnerships
In order to obtain a better understanding of the consequences of the at-
will character of partnerships for businesspeople’s willingness to partici-
pate in otherwise profitable enterprises, we model the partnership form of
organization as suﬀering from the probability that a disagreement or
holdup attempt among the partners would lead to an untimely dissolution
of the firm. Imagine a firm whose total return per unit of capital is R, where
R  1  r, the market rate of interest. We assume there is no asymmetric
information. We also assume that a firm consists only of an entrepreneur
and an investor, each of whom contributes capital (K  KE  KI ). We re-
lax this last assumption later on in order to consider explicitly the case
where large-scale enterprises must raise capital from a greater number of
investors.
If the firm is organized as a partnership, the two participants face costs
associated with the probability that an otherwise successful enterprise will
be forced to dissolve. We take this probability (d ) to be given exogenously
for each firm by the prevailing legal rules and by the existence of social in-
stitutions, such as the family or the community, that help govern relations
among partners. If the firm is forced to dissolve, we assume that it must sell
its assets on the cheap and that the return to the firm will be R. We assume
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further that  is less than 1 and that it is the same for all firms. That is, in or-
der to keep the analysis simple, we assume that firms diﬀer only in the mag-
nitude of the profits they can earn and in their dissolution probabilities. If
the firm is organized as a partnership, then, its return on capital, RP , is
RP  (1  d )R  dR.
Both the entrepreneur and the investor earn the same return as the firm.
(RPE  RPI  RP , where RPE and RPI are the returns to the entrepreneur and
to the investor respectively.) Both, therefore, face the same participation
constraint. That is, they will participate in the enterprise only if they expect
to be able to earn at least as much as they could in the market—that is, 
1  r:
RPE  RPI  (1  d )R  dR  1  r
The implications of these participation constraints are apparent if we take
 and r as given. As figure 4.1 illustrates, for each R there is a unique d∗
(represented by the top upward-sloping curve) above which no partner-
ships will be formed.
As this analysis suggests, the partnership form is socially ineﬃcient be-
cause the expected return that a firm can earn if it organizes as a partner-
ship is below the return that could be earned if there were no problem of
untimely dissolution. Because of this organizational cost, if the partner-
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Fig. 4.1 How profit rates and the probability of withdrawal aﬀect whether partner-
ships will form
Note: The probability of dissolution is 1 – (1 – d )n, where d is the individual probability of
withdrawal and n is the number of partners. The values of R are illustrative only. Once R 
(1  r)/, partnerships are feasible irrespective of the number of partners. In our example 
(1  r)/  1.47.
ship were the only available form that businesspeople could choose, many
firms that would be socially valuable would not form. The situation, more-
over, is even worse if we relax our assumption that the firm consists of only
two partners. If we assume that each member of the firm has an indepen-
dent probability (d ) of forcing a dissolution, then the probability that no
dispute will occur is (1 – d )n, and the probability of untimely dissolution,
D, equals 1 – (1 – d )n, where n is the number of partners. As figure 4.1 shows,
the more partners there are, the more likely it is that profitable business
opportunities will go unrealized. By extension, projects that require large
amounts of capital, and thus many investors, are unlikely to be undertaken
as partnerships.
4.3 Corporations and the Problem of Minority Oppression
This unsatisfactory situation captures the essential details of the U.S.
business environment in the early nineteenth century. By mid-century,
however, most states had responded to the problem of untimely dissolution
in partnerships by providing businesspeople with an alternative organiza-
tional form: the corporation. Unlike partnerships, corporations were by
definition legal persons whose existence was in no way dependent on the
ongoing participation of the people who founded them. Indeed, the iden-
tity of each and every one of a corporation’s members could change with-
out aﬀecting the continuance of the enterprise (Freund 1896).18
Corporations solved the problem of disagreements among members of
the firm by making the controlling shareholders eﬀectively dictators. But
this solution itself was potentially a source of problems. Because the only
members of a corporation who could make decisions were oﬃcers who had
been duly elected by the shareholders, any coalition that determined the
election of oﬃcers also controlled the firm. This coalition could then use
its power to benefit its members at the expense of other shareholders. Al-
though the latter were only limitedly liable for the enterprise’s debts and
thus, in most cases, stood to lose no more than their investments, they had
no means of preventing the controlling shareholders from expropriating
some of their share of the returns.19
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18. Of course, if an associate who had critical human capital withdrew, the business might
be more likely to fail. Hence, corporations too were potentially subject to holdup. But we as-
sume that this problem was small for corporations compared to partnerships and ignore it in
our subsequent analysis.
19. We should point out that we are less concerned here with the specific legal forms that
firms took than with the trade-oﬀ between these two transaction costs—untimely dissolution
and minority oppression. We do not wish to deny that special types of partnerships did
emerge (and were recognized by the courts) that had many features of corporations. Joint-
stock companies are the most important example. But because the joint-stock company had
disadvantages—for example, it was diﬃcult to secure full limited liability—it was relatively
rarely used once the corporate form became readily available. Similarly, businesspeople in the
We conceive of this problem of minority oppression as the main cost as-
sociated with the corporate form. Whereas we modeled the return to an in-
vestor in a partnership as a function of the profitability of the enterprise
and the probability of untimely dissolution, we model the return to an in-
vestor in a corporation as a function of the profitability of the enterprise
and the extent of these private benefits of control. Before we describe the
two alternatives more formally, we oﬀer a historical example as evidence
that our stylized version of these two organizational forms captures the
way both businesspeople and the courts thought about the choice between
partnerships and corporations: the case of Burden v. Burden, decided by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1899 (159 N.Y. 287).
The disputants in the case were brothers who had inherited an iron fac-
tory from their father in 1871. The brothers operated the business as a part-
nership for the next ten years but increasingly disagreed about its manage-
ment until, by 1881, their relationship had deteriorated to the point where,
in the words of the court, they “ceased to hold any personal conversation
with each other and discussed their grievances in written communications
only” (159 N.Y. 287 at 295). Finally, James A. Burden, the brother who had
been trained as an ironmaster, decided that he could no longer bear the
conflict and determined to force either a dissolution of the firm and a divi-
sion of the property or the reorganization of the firm as a corporation that
he would control. His brother, I. Townsend Burden, reluctantly agreed to
the latter option, and the business was incorporated as the Burden Iron
Company. James held 1,000 shares in the new concern and Townsend, 998.
The remaining two shares went to James’s associate, John L. Arts, who
held a managerial position in the enterprise. In other words, in order to
avoid the costs of dissolving a profitable enterprise, Townsend consented
to become a minority shareholder in a corporation controlled by his
brother. Although he continued to receive half of the profits that the firm
paid out in dividends, he was completely frozen out of the management.
Townsend brooded over this outcome for three and a half years and then
sued in equity, complaining that his lack of influence in the company had
enabled his brother and Arts to run it in a way that was detrimental to his
interests. In particular, he charged that “James and Arts [had] combined
and conspired together, in violation of their duties as trustees, to the great
damage of the Burden Iron Company, and to build up and sustain their
own private interests” (159 N.Y. 287 at 306). Both the trial court and the
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United States had the option of organizing their firms as limited partnerships, but the legis-
lation regulating this option was so restrictive, and the courts so strict in their interpretation,
that few were formed. Because the overwhelming majority of businesses in the United States
organized either as ordinary partnerships or as corporations, it is this choice that we model.
See Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005). For an extended discussion of the inadequacies of
joint-stock companies and other variants of partnerships relative to corporations in Britain
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Harris (2000). For a similar analysis
of the U.S. case up to the 1920s, see Warren (1929). See also Blair (2003).
appeals court were unsympathetic. Writing for the latter, Justice Bartlett
acknowledged that “the plaintiﬀ is doubtless quite right when he insists
that he has been ignored in the management of the Burden Iron Company,
and has no control, save to vote his stock, over properties of great value in
which his interest is nearly one-half.” But, he pointed out, Townsend “ap-
parently fails to appreciate that his troubles are inherent in the situation.”
He had voluntarily agreed to give his brother control in order to prevent the
untimely dissolution of an enterprise that was profiting them both. Gener-
alizing from Townsend’s situation, Bartlett explained that “the plaintiﬀ is
in the position of all minority stockholders, who cannot interfere with the
management of the corporation so long as the trustees are acting honestly
and within their discretionary powers.” The plaintiﬀ, he declared, “must
submit” (159 N.Y. 287 at 308).
4.3.1 Modeling the Choice between Partnerships and Corporations
Given these starkly posed diﬀerences between partnerships and corpo-
rations, we return to our basic two-person model and make several addi-
tional assumptions. First, because it now matters who owns the largest
share of the firm’s equity, we assume that the entrepreneur owns more and
has control of the firm—that is,
K  KE  KI and KE  KI .
Second, we assume that the entrepreneur’s control allows her to steal some
fraction () of the firm’s profits, where the magnitude of  is exogenously
determined, in large measure by the legal system (which defines the bound-
ary at which “private benefits of control” become fraud), but also by social
institutions, such as the family or the community, that help govern rela-
tions among members of the firm. Finally, we assume that stealing aﬀects
only the distribution and not the level of the firm’s profits, so that the re-
turn to a corporation is same as the return to the firm, which is greater than
the return to a partnership.
RC  R  RP
Under these assumptions, so long as she can earn at least 1  r, the en-
trepreneur will always want to organize the firm and always as a corpora-
tion, because the return to a corporation is higher than that to a partner-
ship and because her ability to steal earns the entrepreneur even more. The
investor, however, will only be willing to invest in a corporation under the
following conditions:
RCI  R(1  )  1  r
Taking , , and r as fixed, then this participation constraint implies there
is a unique R∗ such that investors will only participate in corporations if 
R  (1  r)/(1 – )  R∗.
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If R  R∗, then firms will only form if they can be organized as partner-
ships. But entrepreneurs and investors will only be willing to organize part-
nerships to exploit otherwise attractive opportunities if the probability of
untimely dissolution is not too high. That is,
RP  (1  d )R  dR  1  r.
If R  R∗, then corporations will be organized if the entrepreneur has
the power to choose the form of organization, but for some range of R there
will be a conflict between the preferences of the investor and those of the
entrepreneur. Investors will prefer to organize the firm as a corporation if
RCI  RPI . That is,
(1  )R  [1  d(1  )]R.
In other words, the investor prefers a corporation if
d  	
1 


	 .
The resulting distribution of organizational forms is displayed in figures
4.2 and 4.3. In figure 4.2 we hold  fixed and allow d to vary. The vertical
line indicates R∗, the threshold value of R below which corporations can-
not form, and the upward-sloping line, d∗(R), demarcates the boundary
above which partnerships cannot form. Similarly, in figure 4.3 we fix d and
allow  to vary. In this case, R∗ refers to the threshold value below which
partnerships do not form (variation on the vertical axis does not aﬀect
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Fig. 4.2 The choice of organizational form as a function of the probability of 
dissolution, holding private benefits of control constant
Note: d ∗(R) is the line that separates the “no firms” area from the “partnership” area. The
values of R and d are illustrative only. In this example, R∗ (the expected return needed to form
a corporation) is 1.4.
them), and the upward-sloping line, ∗(R), defines the feasible area for
corporations.
The figures underscore two important implications of our model. First,
in equilibrium there is likely to be a demand for both organizational forms.
Second, some firms do not form simply because of organizational diﬃcul-
ties. If  is big, there will be a large range of firms for which profits are too
low to induce investors to participate in a corporation. Whether or not
these firms form depends on the magnitude of d. Clearly, therefore, it
would be eﬃcient to reduce d and even more salutary to reduce ; in soci-
eties with high transaction costs of these types, improvements in institu-
tions hence can have an important impact on growth. Nonetheless, it
should be noted that the firms that do not form are those with relatively low
returns. For firms with high enough returns, organizational diﬃculties are
a nuisance but do not aﬀect entry.
4.3.2 Extensions of the Model
In this section, we consider two extensions of the model: the case where
the entrepreneur is poor and so owns less of the firm than the investor; and
the case where there are more than two members of the firm. In an appen-
dix, we consider a third possibility—that equity shares are endogenous
and distinguishable from investment shares. There we consider the pos-
sibility that the entrepreneur could increase her profit by reducing the
investor’s equity stake until his return approached that of the market. We
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Fig. 4.3 The choice of organizational form as a function of the extent of private
benefits of control, holding the probability of dissolution constant
Note: ∗(R) is the line that separates the “no firms” area from the “corporations” area. The
values of R and d are illustrative only. In this example, R∗ (the expected return needed to form
a corporation) is 1.4.
also consider the possibility that the entrepreneur could increase the range
of profits over which the investor was willing to participate in a corpora-
tion by oﬀering him a higher equity stake in order to raise his return. As we
show, the entrepreneur would be constrained in pursuing this second strat-
egy by her need to maintain control. Therefore, the closer her initial share
to 50 percent, and the higher , the more likely the enterprise would orga-
nize as a partnership.
Suppose that the entrepreneur is the owner of a scarce asset (for ex-
ample, an invention), but that she is poor, so KE  KI . This reversal does
not change the model so far as partnerships are concerned, because for
partnerships the participation constraint is the same for both the entrepre-
neur and the investor and does not depend on their respective ownership
shares. For corporations, however, the change in relative equity stakes
means that the investor will now have control. As a result, the investor’s re-
turn will always be greater than that of the entrepreneur, and it is now the
entrepreneur’s participation constraint that binds. Because the entrepre-
neur’s participation constraint is identical to that of the investor in the
original model, reversing the relative equity stakes of the entrepreneur and
investor does not alter the boundary of the region where corporations are
feasible. It can, however, alter the entrepreneur’s choice of organizational
form when both partnerships and corporations are feasible and dissolu-
tion costs are low. In particular, if the entrepreneur gets to choose the form
of organization and R  R∗ and d 
 /(1 – ), she will now opt for a part-
nership instead of a corporation. The partnership is less socially eﬃcient
than the corporation, but it is the only way, in the environment that we have
constructed, for the entrepreneur to protect herself from the expropriation
that loss of control entails. The consequence is that she, the investor, and
society will have to bear the costs associated with untimely dissolution in
partnerships.
Suppose now that there are multiple investors in the corporation. If the
entrepreneur retains control (that is, if the entrepreneur owns a majority of
the stock in her own right or is part of a binding coalition that collectively
owns a majority share), then the analysis is the same as in the basic model.
If there is a controlling coalition but the entrepreneur is not a member of
it, then the case is like that of the poor entrepreneur just described (though
as the number of members of the firm grows large, and therefore partner-
ships become comparatively more costly, one would expect the entrepre-
neur instead to insist on membership in the governing coalition). In other
words, the only significant deviation from our model occurs in situations
where there is no predetermined group or individual that has control. We
can conceive of this case theoretically by imagining that every member of
the firm, including the entrepreneur, has an equal chance ex ante of being
part of the governing coalition. Because everyone is equally likely to end
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up in a situation where she or he can extract private benefits of control,
everyone has the same expected return, which is equal to the firm’s return.
This type of corporation would always be chosen over a partnership.
The entrepreneur, however, would always prefer to be sure that she
would be part of a controlling coalition, because in that way she could ob-
tain the private benefits that derive from control. If the relationship be-
tween the entrepreneur and the other members of the coalition was such
that contractual guarantees of the group’s stability were needed, there was
a readily available mechanism in the form of a voting trust. Moreover, there
was little uncertainty about the enforceability of such contracts, because
voting trusts repeatedly were upheld by the courts.20 One might expect,
therefore, to find coalitions formed to control firms wherever profits were
high enough to induce outside investors to participate. Where profits were
too low to attract participation, one would expect the entrepreneur to
forgo her certainty of control rather than form a less eﬃcient partnership.
Such forbearance, however, would only be feasible if there were at least
three principals. If there were just two, one would inevitably have control,
and the only solution to minority oppression would be a partnership.
4.4 Trends in the Limits on Private Benefits of Control
As we have already seen, despite the costs potentially imposed on in-
vestors by majority shareholders’ private benefits of control, increasing
numbers of corporations were formed during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, and increasing numbers of investors willingly pur-
chased their shares. One possible explanation for these trends is that the
legal system placed additional constraints on the ability of controlling
shareholders to deflect returns in their direction—that is, reduced the mag-
nitude of . As we shall see, however, the changes that occurred during this
period in the legal rules governing corporations appear to have worked in
the opposite direction.
Just as the courts recognized that there was a problem of holdup in part-
nerships, they understood that minority shareholders in corporations were
vulnerable to exploitation by the majority. But they faced two important
problems that prevented them from oﬀering the former much in the way of
protection. The first was that minority shareholders did not have standing
under the common law to redress their grievances by suing corporate oﬃc-
ers and directors who abused their positions. Corporations were legal per-
sons, and as a result, only they and not their shareholders could initiate
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20. See, for example, Brown v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 4 F. Cas. 420 (1867); Faulds v.
Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870); Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mass. 105 (1900); and Manson v. Curtis, 223
N.Y. 313 (1918).
legal action.21 Although abusers who were in positions of control were
unlikely to allow themselves to be sued by their corporations, this problem
was relatively easily surmounted by granting minority shareholders the
right under certain circumstances to pursue a case in their own names in a
court of equity, rather than at common law. The key precedent was Robin-
son v. Smith (3 Paige 222 [1832]), in which New York’s chancellor explicitly
extended to business corporations principles of trusteeship that had previ-
ously been used to protect beneficiaries of charitable entities. The chancel-
lor posited that the directors of a corporation were equivalent to trustees
and that the stockholders, having a joint interest in the corporation’s prop-
erty, were “cestui que trusts.” Declaring that equity courts never permit
wrongs “to go unredressed merely for the sake of form,” he indicated that
the stockholders might, after demonstrating that the corporation was con-
trolled by those who were abusing their trust, file a bill in their own names,
“making the corporation a party defendant.”22
The second and more diﬃcult problem that the courts faced was to pro-
tect minority shareholders without undermining the legal diﬀerences be-
tween corporations and partnerships—that is, without creating a situation
in which disagreements among members of the firm could disrupt the func-
tioning of corporations as easily as they did partnerships. For this reason,
the courts were very conservative in defining what constituted an abuse of
trust by those in control. For example, they quickly settled on the principle
that shareholders could not sue oﬃcers and directors of corporations
simply because they pursued policies that the former thought were wrong-
headed or disadvantageous. Such disagreements were matters of business
judgment and, as such, beyond the purview of the courts. Hence, when
Thomas A. Edison sought to force the Edison United Phonograph Com-
pany to adhere to his own sense of how the business should be conducted
by suing in equity to have the directors removed or, failing in that, to have
the corporation dissolved, the court rebuﬀed his request: “No rule of law is
better settled than that which declares that, so long as the directors of a
corporation keep within the scope of their powers and act in good faith and
142 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal
21. This principle underpinned the decision of Chief Justice John Marshall of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Dartmouth College v. Woodward (17 U.S. 518 [1819]). Massachusetts
Supreme Court Justice Lemuel Shaw explicitly articulated its implications for minority share-
holders in Smith v. Hurd in 1847: “The individual members of the corporation, whether they
should all join, or each severally, have no right or power to intermeddle with the property or
concerns” of the firm. They also have no power to “call any oﬃcer, agent or servant to ac-
count.” If there was an injured party, it was the corporation, the legal person whose rights
were at stake, and only the corporation itself could take action to redress the damage (53
Mass. 371 at 384–87). For a similar English case, see Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, forthcoming.
22. For a more complete discussion of this case, as well as the Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward and Smith v. Hurd decisions, see Bloch and Lamoreaux (2004). That there was a similar
trend in English law can be seen from the cases cited in Robinson v. Smith and also in the later
U.S. Supreme Court decision Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1856).
with honest motives, their acts are not subject to judicial control or revi-
sion” (Edison v. Edison United Phonograph Co., 52 N.J. Eq. 620 [1894]). Un-
less the directors had clearly exceeded their statutory powers, the courts
were unwilling to intervene in the aﬀairs of a solvent corporation without
compelling evidence that those in control had engaged in fraudulent or il-
legal acts that had inflicted serious damage on the corporation or its share-
holders. Moreover, the burden of proof was on the shareholders bringing
the suit. As the Massachusetts Supreme Court explained in the oft-cited
case of Dunphy v. Traveller Newspaper Association, “it is always assumed
until the contrary appears, that [directors] and their oﬃcers obey the law,
and act in good faith towards all their members” (146 Mass. 495 at 497
[1888]).
That this interpretation of the Robinson v. Smith precedent operated to
increase the magnitude of —that is, the private benefits that controlling
shareholders could extract from their associates—is suggested by the
changing way in which courts responded to situations in which directors
had conflicting interests. There was a long-established principle of law that
contracts tainted by conflicts of interest were voidable. This rule was an
absolute one and applied to contracts that otherwise seemed completely
reasonable, so that even though “the contract could not have been let on
better terms, . . . the principle of law applicable to such a contract renders
it immaterial . . . whether there has been any fraud in fact, or any injury
to the company” (Flint and Pere Marquette Railway Company v. Dewey, 14
Mich. 477 [1866] at 487–88). Moreover, there is no question that the prin-
ciple applied to corporations, as the U.S. Supreme Court emphatically
aﬃrmed in 1880 in Wardell v. Railroad Company, a case that arose as a re-
sult of a contract that oﬃcers of the Union Pacific Railroad had negotiated
with a coal company that they themselves had organized. Writing for the
court, Justice Field declared:
Directors of corporations, and all persons who stand in a fiduciary rela-
tion to other parties, and are clothed with power to act for them, are sub-
ject to this rule; they are not permitted to occupy a position which will
conflict with the interest of parties they represent and are bound to pro-
tect. They cannot, as agents or trustees, enter into or authorize contracts
on behalf of those for whom they are appointed to act, and then person-
ally participate in the benefits. (103 U.S. 651 [1880] at 658)
In this particular case, however, the action to void the contract was taken
in the name of the corporation, whose directors had never formally ap-
proved it (the agreement had been drawn up and executed by the railroad’s
executive committee and had not been submitted to the board). Hence, the
justices did not have to consider what the outcome of their decision would
have been if the suit had been brought by a minority shareholder. The cases
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Field cited in his decision suggest the outcome might well have been diﬀer-
ent,23 and, indeed, there is evidence that state courts had for some years
been applying what was in eﬀect a reasonableness standard in such cir-
cumstances. For example, in the frequently cited case of Hodges v. New En-
gland Screw Company, the Rhode Island Supreme Court refused to invali-
date the sale of assets by one corporation to another that was controlled by
essentially the same people, determining that the plan was “judicious, and
for the interest of the Screw Company” (1 R.I. 312 [1850] at 343). More-
over, the very next year after its Wardell decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
established in the case of Hawes v. Oakland what was in eﬀect a reason-
ableness standard. A stockholder victimized by such a conflict of interest
could “sustain in a court of equity in his own name” only in the case of
a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated by the acting man-
agers, in connection with some other party, or among themselves, or
with other shareholders as will result in serious injury to the corporation,
or to the interests of the other shareholders; Or where the board of di-
rectors, or a majority of them, are acting for their own interest, in a man-
ner destructive of the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other
shareholders; Or where the majority of shareholders themselves are op-
pressively and illegally pursuing a course in the name of the corporation,
which is in violation of the rights of the other shareholders. (our empha-
sis, Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 [1881] at 460)24
As the phrases we italicized indicate, in order to secure the intervention of
the courts, minority shareholders had to demonstrate that the actions
taken by those in control were both fraudulent and seriously injurious.
Not only did the courts burden complaining shareholders with the task
of proving that a contract tainted by conflict of interest was unreasonable,
but there is evidence that they tended to give the controlling group the ben-
efit of the doubt on the grounds that its members were unlikely deliberately
to take actions that eroded the value of their own stock. Hence, the Rhode
Island court asserted in the case of Hodges v. New England Screw Company,
“we are the more confirmed in [our conclusion that the sale of assets was
appropriate], when we recollect that the directors owned a large majority
144 Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal
23. For example, Flint and Pere Marquette Railway v. Dewey was brought by a corporation
whose directors had ratified a contract proposed by the company’s president without know-
ing that the president stood to profit from the arrangement. In its decision, the court raised
the possibility that the contract might possibly be construed as binding if it had been ratified
by the board “after a full explanation and knowledge of their interest and of all the circum-
stances” (14 Mich. 477 [1866] at 487).
24. In this decision the Supreme Court was deliberately qualifying a more liberal standard
that it had articulated in the 1856 case of Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331. The qualification was
a response to a flood of lawsuits that the earlier decision had stimulated and hence a good ex-
ample of how the courts attempted to balance, on the one hand, their eﬀort to limit the extent
of the private benefits of control with, on the other, their desire not to encourage rent seeking
by minority shareholders. For further discussion of these cases, see Bloch and Lamoreaux
(2004).
of the capital stock of the Screw Company, and could not reduce the plain-
tiﬀ’s stock, without, at the same time, and in the same proportion, reduc-
ing the value of their own” (1 R.I. 312 [1850] at 343–44). Similarly, in Faud
v. Yates, the Illinois Supreme Court found nothing wrong with a partner-
ship agreement entered into by three stockholders of the Chicago Carbon
and Coal Company. Collectively the three held a majority of the corpora-
tion’s stock, and their agreement committed them to cast their votes in a
block so that they could control the election of the board of directors. The
partnership also leased the company’s coal lands and operated its mines. In
the view of the court, “The record wholly fails to disclose any injury to the
other shareholders—any waste of the property,” and therefore there was
no reason to invalidate the agreement. But the court went even further and
asserted that there was no conflict of interest involved because the incen-
tives of the partners and of other shareholders were aligned. The partners,
according to the court, “had a double interest to protect,—their interests
as shareholders, and their interests as lessees. . . . As shrewd, skillful and
prudent men, they were desirous of increasing the investment, and making
the stock more valuable. Their interests were identical with the interests of
the minority shareholders” (57 Ill. 416 [1870] at 420–21).
The courts were willing to intervene in cases where conflicts of interest
led to contracts that were demonstrably fraudulent. This willingness
placed limits on , but it is important to underscore that the shift was
from a situation in which the courts would always permit such contracts
to be voided to one in which complaining shareholders had to clear sig-
nificant hurdles in order to obtain redress. It is diﬃcult to get a precise
idea of how high the hurdles were in actual practice without systemati-
cally studying the dispensation of cases at the lower-court level. We can,
however, obtain some sense of the standards the courts applied from the
case law. For example, one way in which plaintiﬀs could make the case that
contracts tainted by conflicts of interest were fraudulent was to submit ev-
idence that the resulting payments were substantially in excess of market
levels. Hence Townsend Burden lost his case against his brother James in
part because he was unable to show that James had paid too much for iron
ore purchased from another company that he controlled. The trial court
concluded that there was no evidence that these purchases were “made in
bad faith or with any intent to defraud,” but to the contrary that they had
saved the Burden Iron Company money (Burden v. Burden, 159 N.Y. 287
[1899] at 306).
Even with such proof, complaining stockholders were in a much
stronger position if they could also show that the controlling group had
knowingly behaved improperly. Otherwise, their grievance was liable to be
dismissed because the courts agreed that “mere errors of judgment are not
suﬃcient as grounds for equity interference; for the powers of those en-
trusted with corporate management are largely discretionary” (Leslie v.
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Lorillard, 110 N.Y. 519 at 532 [1888]). In Brewer v. Boston Theatre, the
plaintiﬀs were able to make their case that several of the directors were
fraudulently extracting profits from the corporation by showing that the
latter had deliberately concealed their involvement in contracts from the
other members of the board (104 Mass. 378 [1870]). Similarly, in Almy v.
Almy, Bigelow and Washburn, the plaintiﬀ was able to document that, after
she had refused to sell them her stock, the controlling shareholders had
tried to force her out of the company by, among other things, voting exces-
sive salaries “to each and every member of the board, except the plaintiﬀ
Almy,” as well as voting themselves other “gifts and gratuities” (235 Mass.
227 [1920] at 233).
As these last cases suggest, the courts did intervene in corporations and
punish controlling shareholders who exploited their position to the detri-
ment of other owners. Before they were willing to act, however, judges
demanded compelling evidence of misdeeds. In Flint and Pere Marquette
Railway v. Dewey, the Michigan Supreme Court had warned that if self-
dealing contracts “were held valid until shown to be fraudulent and cor-
rupt, the result, as a general rule, would be that they must be enforced in
spite of fraud and corruption” (14 Mich. 477 at 488). That prophesy was
borne out by the late nineteenth century. Although  was bounded, it was
positive and nontrivial. Moreover, its magnitude seems if anything to have
increased during this period.
4.5 Conclusion
Partnerships and corporations each suﬀered from a diﬀerent organiza-
tional problem. Because partnerships eﬀectively existed only at the will
of each of the members of the firm, they suﬀered from the potentially
costly problem of untimely dissolution. That is, disagreements among
members of a firm could lead one of the partners to withdraw from the
enterprise, disrupting the operations of an otherwise profitable business
and perhaps necessitating the liquidation of firm-specific assets. This
problem may have grown worse over the course of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries because changes in the legal rules underscored
the at-will character of partnerships, establishing with greater certainty
the principle that all partnership contracts, even those for fixed terms,
were revocable. The greater the number of partners, the greater the prob-
lem. Indeed, if partnerships had been the only available organizational
form during this period, it is likely that it would have been extremely diﬃ-
cult to raise equity in the sums necessary for large-scale capital-intensive
enterprises.
But partnerships were not the only available organizational form. By the
mid-nineteenth century businesspeople in most states could readily orga-
nize their enterprises as corporations instead. Although disagreements
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among members of the firm could and did arise in corporations as well as
in partnerships, the rules of corporate governance gave controlling share-
holders what were in eﬀect dictatorial powers. Majority shareholders could
ignore the complaints of the minority if they so chose, and the latter had
little choice but to grin and bear it. Members of the minority could not im-
pose their will on the controlling shareholders, nor could they force a dis-
solution of the enterprise. This protection against untimely dissolution,
however, came at a significant cost, for the same dictatorial authority that
allowed the majority to disregard the views of the minority also gave con-
trolling shareholders the power to expropriate more than their fair share of
the company’s earnings.
Although the media periodically published dramatic revelations of
shenanigans by groups in control of corporations (aside from the Crédit
Mobilier scandal, perhaps the most famous was Charles Francis Adams’s
Chapters of Erie [Adams and Adams 1871]), there appears to have been no
major groundswell for reform until fallout from the 1929 stock market
crash provoked Congress to create the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in 1934. Even then, however, the legislation applied only to large pub-
licly traded corporations, and minority investors in privately held firms re-
mained largely unprotected. There is some evidence that, by the 1930s,
judges had become more receptive to shareholders’ complaints than was
the case earlier (Marsh 1966; Mark 2003), but major changes in the status
of investors in private corporations would only come during the post–
World War II period, when states began to revise their general incorpora-
tion statutes in ways that increased the ability of shareholders in close cor-
porations to protect themselves contractually. During the third quarter of
the century, many states also passed legislation granting shareholders new
legal remedies against majority oppression and other similar ills (O’Neil
1978; Hillman 1982), and yet another wave of legislation at the end of the
twentieth century provided small businesses with access to alternative or-
ganizational forms, most notably the limited liability partnership (LLP)
and the limited liability company (LLC)—forms that potentially mitigated
the contracting problems associated with both corporations and partner-
ships (Lamoreaux and Rosenthal 2005).
If protecting outside investors was unequivocally a good thing, one
might expect the law to have evolved much more quickly in ways that in-
creased minority shareholders’ ability to defend themselves against expro-
priation by those in control of corporations. As we have seen, however, the
changes that occurred in the law appear to have had precisely the opposite
eﬀect during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Because
judges were intent on preventing disputes among members of the firm from
disrupting the operation of corporations the way they did partnerships,
they were not willing to allow disgruntled shareholders easy access to the
courts. In fact, rather than give shareholders a legal weapon to use against
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corporate oﬃcers and directors, judges preferred to emasculate the long-
standing common-law rule that contracts in which one party had a conflict
of interest were voidable per se.
Although we have no way of estimating the magnitude of the private
benefits that controlling shareholders could extract from their corpora-
tions without running afoul of the law, the legal record suggests that they
were quite high. If they were low, moreover, we should have observed a
steep decline in the number of partnerships during this period. Not only
was there no such fall, but large numbers of partnerships continued to be
formed. At the same time, the number of corporations also evinced a
steady rise, as did investors’ willingness to put their money in corpora-
tions.25 Given that d and  were both probably increasing rather than de-
creasing, the high rate at which firms were forming during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries is most likely attributable to the
availability of large numbers of good (high-profit) projects. Everything
that we know about this period of U.S. history—the rapid population
growth, fall in transportation and communications costs, settlement of the
continent, discovery of raw material resources, and dramatic pace of tech-
nological change—suggests that attractive entrepreneurial opportunities
were indeed abundant. Many of these opportunities required capital in
amounts suﬃcient to exploit economies of scale, making it especially im-
portant to have access to a form that would not suﬀer disruption as the
number of investors increased. To the extent that these large projects also
yielded returns that were high relative to government bonds or other simi-
lar assets, the private benefits of control that majority shareholders were
able to extract were more an annoyance than a serious deterrent to in-
vestors. The Great Depression of the 1930s would dramatically alter this
calculus, disrupting the legal equilibrium of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries and setting the economy oﬀ on a new path of institu-
tional change, one whose outcome would be a set of statutes and prece-
dents that were much more solicitous of the rights of minority investors.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the number of corporations relative to partner-
ships would significantly increase.
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25. Although newspaper announcements and other similar sources indicate that large
numbers of partnerships as well as corporations were forming during this period, there are no
data that enable us to measure trends in the relative numbers of partnerships and corporations
before the income tax was imposed in 1916. The counts of the number of partnerships and
corporations that the Internal Revenue Service published in its annual reports, Statistics of
Income, indicate that the number of partnerships relative to corporations decreased in the
1920s, held stable in the 1930s, increased in the 1940s, and decreased in the 1950s. Only the
last of these trends probably represented a significant shift in the businesspeople’s preferred
organizational forms. The others probably owed more to changes in tax levels that forced
more (or less) partnerships to file returns. Corporations had to file regardless of whether they
owed taxes, but partnerships did not.
Appendix
The Case of Endogenous Equity Stakes
The assumption that investment and equity stakes are identical seems
reasonable in light of what we know about business practices in the nine-
teenth-century United States. It is also justifiable on theoretical grounds. If
two members of a firm are similar in all respects except for the relative size
of their investments, Nash bargaining would lead them to split the equity
according to their contributions. The assumption of equal investment and
equity stakes does, however, have two important implications. The first is
that the investor earns above-market returns in nearly all of the firms that
form. Hence, the entrepreneur could increase her profit if she could reduce
the investor’s equity stake until his return approached that of the market.
Second, some firms that do not form could have done so if the entrepreneur
had been able to oﬀer the investor a higher equity stake in order to raise his
return. In this appendix, we explore the consequences of relaxing the as-
sumption of equal equity and investment stakes so that the entrepreneur
can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the investor.26 We assume through-
out that KE  KI . Henceforth, EE will be the equity stake of the entrepre-
neur, and EI the equity stake of the investor.
In a partnership, the investor and the entrepreneur earn the same return
on equity. Setting the investor’s equity stake so that his participation con-
straint binds exactly implies that the investor’s equity stake should be 
EPI  EI (1  r)/RPI , where RPI  [1 – d(1 – )]R. Given KI , allowing the en-
trepreneur to adjust equity stakes endogenously will mean that the inves-
tor’s stake will decline as R increases, all other things being equal. Allowing
such adjustments, however, has no eﬀect on entry decisions for partner-
ships. Indeed, if d  d∗(R), RPI  1  r. But because RPE  RPI , RPE  1 
r, and the entrepreneur will not want to enter. Hence, investors in a part-
nership never have an equity stake that is larger than their investment stake.
In corporations, returns per unit of equity are not the same for the in-
vestor and for the entrepreneur because the latter enjoys the benefits of
control. Setting the investor’s equity stake so that his participation con-
straint binds exactly implies that ECI  EI (1  r)/RCI , where RCI  (1 – )R,
or ECI  EI (1  r)/R(1 – ). As in the case of partnerships, when R  R∗,
investors earn above-market returns, so allowing entrepreneurs to set eq-
uity stakes would lead to declining shares for investors as R increases. Un-
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26. This change allows us to examine more complicated bargains than simple Nash bar-
gaining. Nevertheless, we do not go so far as to allow side contracts to eliminate problems of
minority oppression in corporations. The empirical record (particularly the persistence of
large numbers of partnerships in all sectors of the economy and the extent of the litigation
over minority oppression) simply will not support such a modification.
like the case of partnerships, however, entrepreneurs can aﬀect entry deci-
sions by varying equity stakes. Because the entrepreneur enjoys the bene-
fits of control, some firms do not form because the investor’s return would
be less than the market’s, even though the firm’s return would have been
greater than the market’s. In these cases, the entrepreneur can transfer
some of her return to the investor by increasing his equity stake just enough
to encourage participation. There is, however, an important constraint on
this strategy: the entrepreneur must not lose control. This constraint im-
plies that, holding r, , , KI , and KP fixed, there will be a unique R∗
m be-
low which corporations will not form. Because R∗m  R∗, allowing the en-
trepreneur to set equity stakes will increase the range of profits over which
corporations form.
The entrepreneur wants to transfer just enough equity to the investor to
make him indiﬀerent between participating in the firm and investing in the
market. If the investor’s equity stake becomes larger than one half, he gains
not just additional income rights but also the private benefits that come
with control. This nonlinearity makes the entrepreneur’s problem diﬃcult
when KI is close to K/2. If the profitability of the firm (R) is too low, the
entrepreneur may find it diﬃcult to satisfy the investor’s participation
constraint if she forms a corporation. That is, as the firm’s return rises, the
equity stake that has to be given to the investor in exchange for a given
contribution declines. Conversely, as  increases, because the entrepre-
neur’s private benefits of control increase, the investor must get a larger
share of the equity for a given contribution in order to satisfy his partici-
pation constraint. This larger share in turn makes it more diﬃcult for the
entrepreneur to ensure that she retains control. Hence, the comparative
advantage of the partnership form increases when the two members of the
firm have relatively even investment stakes. When the cost of untimely dis-
solution is low, the entrepreneur will form a partnership instead.
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